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Abstract. Instead of representing a static division of authority 
between the national and state governments, American federalism is 
constantly in flux.  The “devolution revolution” of the mid-1990s 
gave states tremendous power to rewrite the rules of their welfare 
programs, changed the fiscal incentives that states face, and initiated a 
massive health insurance expansion funded primarily the federal 
government but implemented, with great latitude, by states.  How did 
states react?  How did this change the social safety net in the United 
States, and how did it reshape the nation’s distinct brand of 
federalism?  This essay explores these questions, both through a close 
focus how devolution played out in California and through a broader 
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For the first few minutes after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the 
case challenging President Obama’s universal healthcare law – a constitutional battle 
fought over whether the federal government could order individuals to buy health 
insurance, launched by state governments that opposed such mandates – America’s 
leading media outlets got the news wrong.  Fox News and CNN incorrectly reported 
that the health care mandate had been overturned, misleading even the president 
himself.1  Reading the first few pages of the opinion, in which the Court took the 
side of the states in sharply limiting the power of the federal government to regulate 
commerce, reporters first believed that the healthcare law had been overturned.  
Reading further, they saw that Court upheld most parts of the law, interpreting the 
health care mandate as a “tax” which Congress was free to levy.  When they read 
further still, reporters discovered that the opinion struck down the requirement that 
states dramatically expand the healthcare program (known as Medicaid) that provides 
care for the poor and elderly or lose all federal funding for these services.  This 
returned to governors and state legislatures the power to decide how wide their 
social safety nets should be cast.   
The frantic, confused news cycle on the morning of June 28, 2012 serves as a 
microcosm of the shifting story of American federalism.  Exactly which powers 
belong to the federal government and which are reserved to the states has been 
fought out in constitutional conventions, in courtrooms, and on battlegrounds.  
Victories have never been complete and resolutions are never final, but the impacts 
of these fights have always had a profound effect on vital policies governing millions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Neetzan Zimmerman, “President Obama Thought SCOTUS Struck Down 
Individual Mandate Because CNN and Fox News Said So." June 28, 2012. Gawker.  
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of Americans.  This essay focuses on one critical episode in the evolution of 
American federalism and how it has shaped health care and social service policy.      
 
I. American Federalism in Flux 
Throughout its development as a nation, the United States has seen its 
formal governing structures and informal lines of authority redrawn over and over 
again through the constantly contested evolution of American federalism.  Conflicts 
over which powers should belong to the national government and which belong to 
the states are as American as apple pie, the Star Spangled Banner, and Levi’s jeans.  
America’s failed first government under the Articles of Confederation collapsed in 
large part because the federal government was not given enough authority.  The 
debates over the new Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787 often focused on the key 
question of federalism, with the Founders constructing patchwork solutions such as 
state-based representation in the US Senate and the population-based House to bring 
states large and small into agreement.  Since then, two of the nation’s most profound 
and bloodiest internal conflicts – the Civil War from 1861-65 and the civil rights 
movement nearly a century later – have been fought over the intersecting issues of 
race and states’ rights.  Because the national government and states often take 
opposing positions in areas as fundamental as slavery, civil rights, abortion rights, 
and the scope of government, shifting authority from one level to another shifts 
policy in profound ways.  “From the start,” one scholar of the history of American 
federalism notes, “political opponents have fought about federalism because it 
affects who wins and who loses a particular fight (Robertson 2012, p. 8).”      
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In recent decades, battles over federalism have shifted into less hostile but 
still critically important venues.  The federal courts are the final arbiter of what is and 
what is not a state right, and also serve as the final arbiter in the disputes between the 
fifty sovereign states that are inevitable in America’s “horizontal federalism” 
(Zimmerman 2011).  Recent landmark cases have shifted power in different 
directions.  In the 2010 McDonald v. Chicago case, the US Supreme Court struck down 
a Chicago, Illinois handgun ban, ruling that the Constitution’s 2nd Amendment right 
to bear arms constrained state gun control legislation.  Yet the national government 
does not always win in federal courts.  The Supreme Court’s June 28, 2012 decision 
in the National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius case, while upholding much 
of President Obama’s healthcare law, was nonetheless a victory for states because it 
so sharply circumscribed what the federal government could do to regulate 
commerce and to compel states to expand programs like Medicaid that are jointly 
funded by states and by the national government.   
The back and forth of modern federalism has played out most clearly in an 
area of government that is central to both the budgets of federal, state, and local 
governments and to the lives of tens of millions of Americans: the social safety net.  
Power over the design and funding of welfare and healthcare programs has been in 
constant and consequential flux over the past generation.  These social services were 
first provided by individual states with some federal assistance, then standardized 
into the joint federal-state programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” legislation, and more recently have come to be 
shaped more and more by state forces.   
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These changes have over and again rewritten the rules of federalism.  One 
longtime observer of and participant in these battles, who served as an 
intergovernmental affairs advisor to President Richard Nixon, titled a recent essay, 
“There Will Always Be a New Federalism.” (Nathan 2006)  The newest federalism 
was created in the mid 1990s through the “devolution revolution,” which gave states 
tremendous power to rewrite the rules of their welfare programs, changed the fiscal 
incentives that states face, and initiated a massive health insurance expansion funded 
primarily the federal government but implemented, with great latitude, by states.    
In this essay, I ask how the devolution revolution has reshaped federalism in 
the United States.  My focus is on social services because its stakes are so high – with 
joint federal and state expenditures totaling $405 billion dollars in 20092 – and 
because it is in this realm that policy choices and implementation by the two levels of 
government are most deeply intertwined.  I look at how the newest “new federalism” 
-- including the devolution of authority over welfare and the children's health 
insurance program, as well as new intergovernmental fiscal incentives -- has altered 
both state policy and the federal-state relationship.  I begin by explaining how 
federalism now works in the realm of social service policy, describing how federal 
laws shape the level of state flexibility and the variation in policy choices across 
states.  To illustrate how abstract regulations affect concrete political decisions, I turn 
a close focus to how the devolution revolution played out in the nation’s largest 
state, California.  I then draw upon recent data from all states in order to two central 
theses: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In 2009, joint state and federal expenditures on social services included $374 billion for Medicaid, 
$11 billion for the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and $20 billion in Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (Bureau of the Census 2012, Tables 135 and 540).  	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1. The way that federal aid to states is structured has profound fiscal and 
political effects, determining how fast the social service safety net will 
expand.  When Washington, DC began funding state welfare programs 
through block grant, this shift in the structure of aid predictably caused 
growth in state spending on welfare to slow dramatically.  By contrast, 
generous matching grants for Medicaid and children's health insurance have 
put states on a fiscal escalator that has been hard to get off even during 
recessions.   
 
2. Shifts in which level of government funds a social service program have a 
profound effect on which types of Americans pay its bills.  When the federal 
government supports a program, the highly progressive structure of federal 
taxation ensures that more affluent Americans provide most of the funding 
for redistribution.  When states pay more, the burden of welfare funding falls 
more heavily on middle- and low-income residents because state taxes in the 
US are generally regressive.   
 
After demonstrating these points, I conclude by putting my findings in the 
broader context of the literature on federalism and on political representation, and by 
speculating about the lessons they hold for future policy devolution.  
 
II. The Devolution Revolution in Social Services 
 The construction of America’s social safety net – the healthcare, welfare, and 
pensions provided to the aged, the needy, and the disabled – is a complex story of 
federal and state policymakers working together to provide services that are funded 
both by government and by the private sector (see Hacker’s 2002 The Divided Welfare 
State) and delivered both through bureaucracies and through private actors (see 
Morgan and Campbell’s 2011 The Delegated Welfare State).  Any brief summary of its 
history necessarily omits important details.  Still, I begin this section by outlining 
how the development of America’s welfare state interacts with federalism, and then 
devote the rest of the section to a close look at one critical period: the “devolution 
revolution” in social services that took place during the 1990s.  I discuss the political 
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bargains that led lawmakers in Washington, DC to give state leaders more authority 
over their safety nets and to change the funding formulas that structure 
intergovernmental aid.  I then analyze how those formulas shape the incentives of 
state policymakers.  To illustrate the ways in which the new authority and new 
incentives affected state policy choices, I provide a case study that focuses on how 
the devolution revolution led to the expansion of one program but the contraction 
of another in California. 
 The American welfare state has its roots in the pensions provided for 
veterans of the nation’s Civil War during the late nineteenth century and in the 
payments granted to impoverished single women with children in the early twentieth 
century (Skocpol 1992).  The veterans’ pensions were federally funded, but state 
governments played an important cooperative role in the early development of social 
service programs (Johnson 2007).  For instance, California’s 1941 budget included 
$38 million in federal assistance payments to the aged, blind and children, matched 
by $22 million in state funds.  The two landmark expansions of these joint state-
federal social services came with the “New Deal” policies passed under President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s and the “Great Society” policies passed by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s.  The New Deal established pensions for 
the elderly and systematized welfare payments to the poor through what became 
known as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.  The 
Great Society created, among other programs, the Medicaid program to fund health 
care for the poor, the elderly in nursing homes, and the disabled.  Both Medicaid and 
AFDC would be administered by the states, with the federal government paying at 
least half of the cost through “matching grants” (and more than half of the cost in 
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the less affluent states).  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Democrats in Congress 
passed new laws giving states the opportunity to expand their safety nets 
(Congressional Research Service 1993, Coughlin, Ku, and Holahan 1994).  Because 
the matching grants offered them such a good deal, which I detail below, most states 
took advantage of this opportunity and widened their safety nets.  Then, in the 
devolution revolution of the 1990s, lawmakers in Washington, DC changed the 
funding relationship between the federal and state governments, giving states more 
autonomy but at the same time halting the growth of one of these social service 
programs.       
  
II A. Roots of the Revolution  
In the mid 1990s, the roots of this revolution were planted by two trends, 
one economic and one political.  First, a national recession put tremendous fiscal 
pressure on states, especially in the area of social services.  Though the recession 
lasted only from July 1990 through March 1991,3 the slow recovery created major 
deficits in state budgets for years to follow.  Twenty-nine states were forced to cut 
their budgets in 1991, and thirty-five states made budget cuts totaling $4.5 billion in 
1992.4  California’s budget did not pass until months past the constitutional deadline 
in 1993, and even as late as 1995, eight states, including New York, were still forced 
to make cuts.5   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee Determines that 
Recession Ended in March 1991". Accessed in October 2011.  
4 National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of the States: October 1992, Washington, 
DC: National Governors Association. 
5 National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of the States: October 1995, Washington, 
DC: National Governors Association. 
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Why did the recession hit states so hard?  One reason is that nearly all 
American states have strict balanced budget requirements,6 a rule that is notably 
lacking at the federal level.  Presidents and Congress can react to deficits by 
increasing spending and cutting taxes, as President Obama and the Democratic 
Congress did with the 2009 stimulus package.  States, by contrast, must balance their 
books through painful cuts and tax increases.  A second reason is that because states 
administer so many of the nation’s safety net services, any financial downturn has a 
two-sided effect on their budgets.  The supply of tax revenues goes down, but the 
demand for social services like Medicaid and welfare rises.  
 A contemporary report by the National Association of Budget Officers at the 
time demonstrated how these supply and demand dynamics threw state budgets out 
of balance: “Both the modest budget growth and the midyear budget adjustments 
reflect the tepid economy as well as pressures from double-digit growth in Medicaid 
spending and increased welfare caseloads.”7  The statements of state leaders testify to 
how they saw these trends.  Medicaid was called the “Pac-man” of state budgets, a 
reference to the video game character who ate up everything around him, and 
Georgia governor Zell Miller compared it to the state’s quick-spreading kudzu plant 
(Weissert 1992).  State officials chafed at what they perceived as a lack of flexibility 
to make major Medicaid and welfare cuts, and called upon Washington, DC to give 
states great power over these increasingly expensive programs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For full detail on the nature of these requirements, see National Conference of State Legislatures, 
NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balance Budget Provisions, Denver, CO: National Conference of State 
Legislatures, October 2010.  
7 Quoted from page 7 of National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of the States: 
October 1992, Washington, DC: National Governors Association. 
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 After the 1994 elections, Congress became much more receptive to such 
demands.  The Newt Gingrich-led “Republican Revolution,” in which the GOP took 
control of the House of Representatives for the first time in a generation, set the 
stage for the devolution revolution.  This shift in party control came in the midst of 
the growing political polarization between the two parties in America (see McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  Whether the sharp disagreement between Democrats 
and Republicans on issues such as the optimal size of the safety net was due more to 
shifts among elected leaders (Fiorina 2005) or among voters, it was clear during the 
1994 elections that the partisan divide was vast.  After winning those elections, 
Gringrich and many other Republicans pushed for a switch from federal matching 
grants for social services to “block grants,” a proposal that had also been made by 
Ronald Reagan.  This was a proposal as much about ideology as it was about 
federalism, since all sides expected that block grants would lead to smaller 
government.  “Block grants aim to provide greater federal budget certainty and a 
stronger state incentive to contain program costs,” according to Lambrew (2005, p. 
1).  They do so by giving states both a fixed annual sum from the federal 
government to run a social service program (increasing predictability) and by making 
states responsible for any and all funding above that sum (providing them with the 
incentive to cut costs).  In 1995, Speaker Gingrich pushed to switch the Medicaid 
program into a block grant to states, but lost in a political battle that revived the 
electoral fortunes of President Bill Clinton.   
The Democratic president had steadfastly opposed major changes in 
Medicaid, but throughout his career had called for “an end to welfare as we have 
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come to know it.”8  He vetoed two early welfare reform bills pushed by Republicans, 
but as the 1996 election approached, Clinton took a centrist position by cutting a 
deal with Gingrich on a major welfare reform package in August of that year.  The 
new law transformed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 
renaming it Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, proposing a five-year lifetime 
limit on benefits, requiring that welfare recipients go back to work after two years on 
the rolls, and providing more child care for working recipients.9  The law also 
changed federalism by making welfare a block grant, and giving states tremendous 
control over how to spend the grant.  No longer did states receive matching dollars 
from the federal government, giving them the greater incentives to cut costs that 
Gingrich had favored for Medicaid.  States were also given great freedom to craft 
their new programs; they could make their lifetime limits either shorter or longer 
than the federal baseline of a five-year limit, they could set the length of the 
workweek required of welfare recipients, and could create other limits or extensions.  
Whether states wished to build a program that was more conservative or more liberal 
that the federal guidelines, they had the flexibility to do so (Kousser 2005, Ch. 7).   
Another major deal cut between Clinton and Gingrich the next year 
completed the devolution revolution.  The creation of the state Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) as part of a budget deal in 1997 put states in charge of 
building a new healthcare program for the children of the working poor and, at state 
discretion, their parents.  Reaching families with incomes too high to qualify for 
Medicaid but too low to purchase private insurance, the program could be offered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bill Clinton, "The New Covenant: Responsibility and Rebuilding the American Community. 
Remarks to Students at Georgetown University," October 23, 1991. 
9 CNN All Politics, “Clinton Signs Welfare Reform Bill, Angers Liberals,” CNN All Politics, August 
22, 1996.  
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through Medicaid, through the plan that covered state employees, or through a new 
program that met specific benchmarks (Health Care Financing Administration 1998).  
State legislatures and governors were left to decide.  In this way, the CHIP program 
gave states another great source of authority.  However, in its funding structure, it 
resembled Medicaid, with matching rates giving the federal government the ability to 
influence state decisions.   
While the move in the mid 1990s to shift policy and fiscal control of social 
services to the states may have been an incomplete victory for the advocates of states 
rights, it still constituted a revolution.  Though Medicaid remained generally 
unchanged, the new CHIP program gave states policy control of a program with 
fiscal incentives still managed by the federal government, and the TANF program 
transformed welfare into a system with policies and purse strings firmly under state 
control.  
In the battles over each of these programs, Democratic and Republican 
leaders in Washington, DC clearly understood that the major policy dimension that 
polarizes American parties – the battle over whether to expand or to shrink 
government – was at stake in the debate over whether to devolve authority and 
restructure grants.  Federalism, to paraphrase Robertson’s (2012) words, would 
determine who won and who lost the fight over health care costs and welfare 
generosity.  Republican support for decentralization of social policy, as Béland and 
de Chantal (2003) have observed, was driven primarily by ideological opposition to 
big government.  To understand completely the link between devolution and the size 
of the safety net, it is necessary to look close at how federal funding formulas can 
influence state decisions. 
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II B. How Federal Funding Formulas Reshape State Incentives 
In the joint federal-state programs that compose America’s healthcare and 
welfare programs, the national government has used both regulations and 
inducements to motivate states to broaden their safety nets.  The regulations have 
come in the requirement that states dramatically expand their welfare (beginning in 
the 1930s) and healthcare programs (starting in the 1960s) to meet new nationwide 
standards.  The inducements have been the federal dollars sent to pay much of the 
cost of these new mandates, structured in a way that gave states a clear incentive to 
meet and often to go beyond the national baseline.  Federal grants were intentionally 
designed to push states toward more generous services than they might otherwise 
provide.  If Washington, DC had sent states block grants of a fixed amount, most 
states would spent all of the federal money while trying hard to minimize state costs 
paid in addition to the block grant.  Instead, federal lawmakers designed matching 
rates that required states to spend their own dollars in order to bring in federal 
money.  The more a state spent of its own, the more money it would bring in from 
Washington, DC, a formula for growth in social service provision. 
The rationale for this system, from economic theories of fiscal federalism, is 
that matching grants should “be employed where the provision of local services 
generates benefits for residents of other jurisdictions (Oates 1999, p. 1127).”  That is, 
because the advantages of providing for the welfare and healthcare of residents in 
one state spill over into other states and the nation as a whole, those benefits should 
be internalized into the decision calculus of lawmakers in each state.  It did not hurt 
that Democrats in Congress at the time favored higher social service spending, and 
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realized that matching grants would create a powerful incentive for states, even ones 
that had traditionally been frugal, to move in this direction.  Importantly, the federal 
matching rate varied across states, and always provided at least one federal dollar for 
each state dollar spent.  Table 1 shows the matching rates that an illustrative sample 
of states receives today in Medicaid and in the CHIP program.  It shows that poorer 
states like Mississippi and New Mexico received a higher match than rich states such 
as California and New York, a deliberate feature of the funding formula designed to 
give state lawmakers in states with tight budgets the ability to provide generous 
services.  
Table 1. Federal Matching Rates for Social Service Programs 
State Medicaid CHIP 
Arkansas $4.31 $4.25 
California $1.60 $1.86 
Kansas $2.30 $2.61 
Mississippi $5.61 $4.87 
Montana $3.54 $3.38 
New York $1.60 $1.86 
New Mexico $4.13 $3.99 
Texas $2.44 $2.46 
Notes: Entries indicate how many dollars will be transferred by the federal government to match one 
dollar of state spending, by program and by state. Medicaid and CHIP figures are from the 2010 
fiscal year, both taken from Kaiser Family Foundation (2011) and Families USA (2011). 
 
Consider the effects of this grant structure on the decision calculus of 
governors and state legislators writing their budgets.  For a program like the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, in New York the nearly two-to-one match 
means that in good times, the state can increase its budget by $100 million dollars 
and deliver, thanks to the federal grant, an additional $286 million in healthcare 
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services to poor families.  When the state budget is flush, this acts like an escalator, 
providing a great incentive to spend a surplus on the CHIP program because 
lawmakers get so much “bang for the buck” in this program area.  But just as the 
federal match makes it easy to increase spending in this area during good times, it 
also makes it hard to cut healthcare spending in bad times.  When New York is in 
deficit, in order to reduce its state deficit by $100 million, lawmakers must eliminate 
$286 million worth of services.  This effectively sends $186 million back to the 
federal government, never an attractive option to state policymakers.  This makes 
cutting healthcare to working families much more difficult, in both political and 
policy terms, than cutting other areas of government like higher education, prisons, 
or primary education that are almost entirely state funded.  Because matching grants 
push states to increase healthcare provision in good times and make it hard to cut in 
bad times, they should be thought of – whether one favors or opposes generous 
social services – as a lever of federal control over state decisions that reduces state 
autonomy.   
In a poor state such as Mississippi, the federal matching rate is even higher.  
This gives the state an even better fiscal deal, at the same time that it makes the 
federal lever of control even stronger.  For $100 million in new state spending, 
Mississippi lawmakers can secure and extra $487 in federal CHIP funds, but of 
course they would have to sacrifice that much in order to trim their state budget by 
$100 million.  Washington, DC structured grants this way during times when 
Democrats controlled government, knowing that the arrangement would lead to 
social service expansion, while Newt Gingrich and other Republicans sought to 
change the formulas in order to shrink government. 
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Yet sometimes lost in this debate about the overall size of government is the 
important redistribution of federal tax dollars across states accomplished by the 
varying matching rates detailed in Table 1.  Pointing out the disparities in these 
matching grants rates paints of portrait of an “equalizing” federalism that is at odds 
with the conventional idea that America’s national government treats all states 
uniformly.  “In all other federal systems,” Robertson (2012, p. 2) writes, “the 
national government deliberately equalizes regional resources by redistributing more 
financial aid to the poorest regions.  The United States is the only federal system that 
does not equalize state resources in this way” (see also Watts, 2006).  In Medicaid, a 
massive program in which the federal government distributes $318 billion in aid 
across the states annually (Bureau of the Census 2012, Table 152), the aid is spread 
out unequally, with the most generous grants going to the poorest states.  At least in 
this realm, American federalism is not exceptional; it redistributes money from rich 
to poor states just as federalism does in other nations. 
 
 
II C. Implementing the Devolution Revolution in California 
 Leaders in each state capitol had little time to ponder such distributional 
concerns in the late 1990s, because the devolution revolution gave them important 
decisions to make.  Every state’s autonomous control over its welfare programs 
dramatically increased after the federal passage of welfare reform in 1996.  While the 
freedom granted by this devolution sent states in different directions, the experience 
of one state can teach general lessons about how the shift in power and the new 
fiscal relationship played out in state capitols around the country.  The nation’s 
	   16	  
largest state, California, has often been a policy leader whose choices, especially in 
social services, have diffused across the rest of the nation (Walker 1969, Gray 1973).  
The state’s government at the time was split between the nation’s two political 
parties, with a Republican governor negotiating policy with a legislature controlled by 
Democrats.  Like the rest of America, the Golden State was just coming out of the 
deep recession, giving policymakers some money to spend on expanding social 
services but leaving them cautious about how such generosity would threaten the 
state budget when lean years returned.  Though never a “typical state,” California’s 
political and fiscal conditions at this time were reflective of what was occurring in 
many other states.  
In California, 1997 was the year of welfare reform, with Washington DC’s 
actions the previous year putting this issue at the top of the agenda for state officials 
at the state’s capitol in Sacramento.  Governor Pete Wilson, a moderate Republican 
who had been elected on a platform of expanding “preventive” social services like 
child care and prenatal health, but who had been forced by the state’s struggling 
economy to push for budget cuts in these and other areas, saw this as a chance to 
leave a major policy legacy.  The Democrats who controlled the two houses of the 
state’s legislature worried that any welfare reform meant welfare cuts to the 
constituents whom many Democrats represented.  Yet while legislators have a 
monopoly over the power to introduce bills in California, as in all American 
legislatures, they felt pressured to respond to the federal mandate for reform as well 
as to the way that block grants changed state fiscal incentives.  As the following 
account shows, this led to one of the paradoxical patterns of federalism: While 
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devolution gives states freedom, it also forces decisions upon them and allows the 
federal government to dictate state policy agendas.  
 When California’s legislature convened for the beginning of its session in 
January, 1997, one influential newspaper columnist wrote that the capitol’s hallways 
were filled with talk of many issues, but that, “There was, however, one topic that 
overshadowed all others in terms of magnitude, uncertainty and urgency: welfare 
reform. Under new federal welfare - reform legislation, Republican Gov. Pete Wilson 
and the Democrat-controlled Legislature have six months to develop an overhaul of 
the system that consumes nearly a fifth of the state budget and supports nearly 5 
million Californians, about 20 percent of the nation's welfare burden.”10  The extent 
to which state action was forced by federal devolution was illustrated by another 
columnist’s quote: “The challenge the state faces to come up with a new welfare 
system is enormous, dictated by the federal welfare reform bill President Clinton 
signed last summer.”11   
Does this mean that devolution pushed the state in a direction that it’s 
leaders did not want to go?  In the legislature’s case, it certainly did.  Prominent 
leaders like Senate Health and Human Services Committee Chair Diane Watson, a 
Democrat representing an inner city Los Angeles district with many welfare 
recipients, certainly would have preferred not to change the existing system.  But 
Gov. Wilson clearly did want change, and seized the political opportunity created by 
federal action.  In the spring of 1997, he gave speeches across the state in support of 
his reform plan, which went beyond the federal guidelines by putting a one-year limit 
on welfare enrollment, cutting the size of monthly checks to recipients, and requiring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Dan Walters, “The Welfare Unknown,” Sacramento Bee, January 8, 1997, p. 6B.  
11 John Jacobs, “Movement on Welfare Reform,” Sacramento Bee, March 25, 1997, p. 6B.  
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them to work 35 hours a week in job training or education programs to receive the 
checks.12 
 Democratic legislative leaders, quite predictably, pushed back against the 
governor’s proposal.  When the bills containing them, authored by Republican 
legislators, reached the Assembly Human Services Committee, the Democratic 
majority on the committee stripped out their key provisions – the one-year time 
limit, the grant reductions, and the 35-hour workweek – on votes that broke down 
along party lines.  “I would suggest that’s gutting the bill to almost nothing,” said 
Republican Assemblyman Keith Olberg, author of one of the bills.13  Yet legislators 
knew that the governor possessed the key power of the veto, giving him the power 
to kill any welfare deal that the Democrats themselves reached and thus assuring that 
the state’s reaction to federal devolution would be a compromise between what 
California Democrats and Republican Gov. Pete Wilson wanted.  Dion Aroner, the 
state Assembly’s Human Services Chair, spoke about welfare reform in a tone that 
was at once resigned to the fact that federal action worked against her policy 
preferences but also optimistic that it opened up new opportunities for positive state 
innovations. “We will do significant damage to lots of families and seniors and kids 
who will be hurt by what the federal government did.” Aroner said. “We can't fix 
that… But if the system becomes more focused on helping people get off welfare 
and finding them jobs, … that will be historic reform.”14  
 In order to craft a compromise that might garner both legislative approval 
and the governor’s signature, top leaders created a conference committee that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 John Jacobs, “Movement on Welfare Reform,” Sacramento Bee, March 25, 1997, p. 6B.  
13 Dana Wilkie, “Democrats gut Wilson proposal to cut welfare Assembly panel leaves only shell, but 
it's not dead yet,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 2, 1997, p. A3. 
14 Quoted in John Jacobs, “Movement on Welfare Reform,” Sacramento Bee, March 25, 1997, p. 6B.  
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brought together 18 members of the Assembly and Senate, many of whom were 
political moderates not closely tied to either side of the issue.  After liberals on the 
committee pushed for a plan that “went as far as it legally could to maintain the 
status quo… Speaker Cruz Bustamante intervened, and he and Senate President Pro 
Tem Bill Lockyer directed Democratic members of a welfare conference committee 
to tone down their plan and make it at least marginally acceptable to moderates.”15   
After Gov. Wilson vetoed the first set of welfare bills sent to him at the 
beginning of the summer, in August he signed a compromise package crafted in the 
conference committee.  Passed on votes of 65-11 in the Assembly and 33-5 in the 
Senate, with liberal Democrats objecting, the plan included an 18-month time limit 
and a 20-hour work requirement, splitting the difference between the governor’s plan 
and the legislature’s proposals.16  Just as importantly for the state, it slowed the 
growth of welfare spending, with all of the savings going to other California 
programs because the funding was sent through a block grant.  The devolution of 
power from the federal government had spurred state action, but the new policy 
bore the imprint of both branches of state government and put all of the savings 
back into California’s budget.   
 Welfare was not the only power passed along to the states by Clinton and the 
Republican in Congress.  In late 1997, after the welfare reform debate was resolved 
in California, state lawmakers were given authority over a newly created program to 
provide health insurance for the children of the working poor through the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program.  Unlike welfare reform, this program was a clear 
expansion of the social safety net, a concession that President Clinton won from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Dan Walters, “Demos’ Welfare Plan Backfires,” Sacramento Bee, June 30, 1997, p. A 
16 Brad Hayward and Dan Smith, “Wilson Gets Landmark Welfare Bill,” Sacramento Bee, p. A1. 
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Newt Gingrich that thrilled Democrats in state capitols across the country and 
calmed the fears of fiscal conservatives with its generous federal matching rate.  
Because every dollar of California spending was matched with nearly two federal 
dollars, Republican Governor Wilson and legislative Democrats both agreed on 
expanding coverage.   
While they could have done so through Medicaid or the government 
employees’ healthcare program, California lawmakers took advantage of the federal 
option to craft a completely new program which they called “Healthy Families.”  The 
privately administered, publicly funded insurance program would be available to 
580,000 children whose parents paid a premium of about $27 per month, costing the 
state $478 million and the federal government $875 million.17  The governor 
proposed a plan that Democratic leaders immediately embraced.  While a handful of 
conservative lawmakers criticized the plan as too costly for the state and some 
Democrats worried that the premiums charged would be too expensive for the poor, 
it passed within weeks with overwhelming bipartisan support.18  
The lessons of this California case study are clear, and confirm the strategies 
that Gingrich and Clinton pursued in Washington, DC.  Giving states more 
autonomy through block grants in welfare led California to contract its welfare 
services and spending, even though the federal law did not strictly mandate such 
retrenchment.  In the Children’s Health Insurance Program, by contrast, the 
generous matching grants combined with state autonomy was a gift that California’s 
Republican governor and Democratic legislators eagerly accepted.  They designed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 John Maurelius, “Wilson Optimistic on Kids’ Health Coverage,” August 28, 1997, San Diego Union 
Tribune, p. A3.  
18 Bill Ainsworth, “Kids Health Plan Could Get OK Today,” San Diego Union Tribune, September 12, 
1997,” p. A1. 
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new program, putting a Californian imprint on the national idea, but happily took 
Washington’s money to expand their health coverage of the working poor.  
Devolving power through different funding structures caused the healthcare safety 
net to widen while the welfare safety net shrunk.      
 
III. The Long-Term Effects of the Devolution Revolution  
 While every state’s reaction to the devolution revolution differed in its 
details, the broad spending trends in health care and welfare across the states mirror 
California’s pattern.  This section examines broad spending patterns to show that 
healthcare expenditures rose consistently after the devolution revolution, while 
welfare spending has often been flat.  This illustrates the argument that grant 
structures help to shape the size of government.  After looking at how much is 
spent, I then ask which citizens pay for safety net spending when more responsibility 
is sent to the states.  Looking at tax distributions at different levels of government 
supports the thesis that devolutions to the states quietly shift the fiscal burden of 
supporting the safety net towards lower- and middle-income Americans.   
 
III A. State Spending Patterns Since the 1990s 
 Just as California’s response to powers devolved from the national 
government was shaped by the state’s partisan configuration, policy needs, and fiscal 
capacity, other states took the devolved responsibilities in different directions.  Their 
governments crafted policies that “fit their states,” in the term often used by 
advocates of devolution, or at least reflected contemporary demands and the 
preferences of state leaders at the time.  To structure their CHIP plans, 13 states 
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chose to expand Medicaid coverage, two offered a program based on the plan 
offered to state employees, but 35 did what California did: they created their own 
new systems, verified as “equivalent” to the benchmark but with state-specific details 
(Kousser 2005, Ch. 7).  When it came to reforming their state welfare systems, 36 
states adopted the federal default of a five-year lifetime limit on benefits, but nine 
states adopted shorter limits and five states enacted longer limits.  In both policy 
areas, states picked policies that generally fit the preferences of the parties holding 
their governorships and state legislatures.  States with more “professional” 
legislatures – those paying full-time salaries, meeting year-round, and employing large 
staffs – were more likely to move beyond the default options and craft innovative 
programs (Kousser 2005, Ch. 7).     
 At the same time that the devolution revolution changed the shape of state 
social safety nets, it also changed their scope.  State spending on healthcare and 
welfare both shifted.  Importantly, they went in different directions, a divergence that 
can be explained by the differing funding formulas chosen for each policy area.  In 
health care, where generous federal matching grants created an incentive for states to 
spend a bit more of their own money to capture many federal dollars, spending rose 
sharply.  By definition, CHIP spending rose as the new program came into being.   
But Figure 1 shows just how much the Medicaid matching rates, preserved in 
the 1995 budget battle that fended off the transition to a block grant, gave states 
both the motivation and the means to spend ever-larger sums on health care for the 
poor, aged, blind, and disabled.  Medicaid spending was already high in the early 
1990s, but since the mid 1990s it rose sharply as medical costs soared and as states  
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Figure 1. Growth in Federal, State, and Total Medicaid Spending Since 
“Devolution Revolution” (in billions) 
 
 
Notes: Medicaid data taken from Table 3 of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ National Health Expenditures Web Tables, accessed at  
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf in 
November, 2011.  
 
frequently added recipients and services to their programs.  This growth generally 
slowed when a stronger economy meant that fewer Americans qualified to receive 
health care coverage, but grew nonetheless.  Total state and federal Medicaid 
spending more than doubled from $161 billion in 1997 to $374 billion in 2009.
 By contrast, the rise in welfare spending was sharply curtailed through the 
welfare reforms of 1996.  As Figure 2 shows, after an initial increase in federal 
expenditures to provide services such as child care and job training in the immediate 
aftermath of welfare reform, spending on this safety net program has been flat or 
decreasing over the past decade.  Since the numbers reported for both Medicaid and 
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Figure 2. Growth in Federal, State, and Total Welfare Spending Since 
“Devolution Revolution” (in billions) 
 
 
Notes: “Welfare” spending defined as Temporary Aid to Needy Family (TANF) total 
federal and total state maintenance of effort spending.  Welfare data taken from 
appropriate tables in the US Department of Health and Human Services’ TANF 
Financial Data Archives, accessed at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/archives.html in November, 2011. 
 
portion of the American safety net.  This is a function of two trends.  First, the 
default guidelines passed down from the federal government to the states tightened 
up welfare eligibility through policies such as weekly work requirements and, most 
importantly, the lifetime limit on benefits.  Although the federal welfare reform did 
also encourage more spending in areas such as child care, and the federal legislation 
did not dictate any reduction in monthly benefit checks, but many states were able to 
contain their costs by trimming their welfare roles once recipients had reached their 
lifetime benefit limits.  The second factor at work here was the shift to a block grant 
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“maintenance of effort” requirements19) keep much of the savings, and this no doubt 
played a role in the many benefit cuts that have come during tough fiscal times over 
the past decade.  
 Overall, the devolution revolution has been a tale of two programs.  Once 
Newt Gingrich’s proposal to block grant Medicaid was defeated, the program saw no 
major policy or funding formula changes.  As a result, this program continued to 
grow through state and primarily federal funds, and was augmented by the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program with its generous matching grants.  In welfare, both 
policy reforms and a shift to block grant funding set the program on a path to 
retrenchment.  Though one could still debate whether the compromise reached by 
Speaker Gingrich and President Clinton led to “an end to welfare as we have come 
to know it,” both the state and national governments have been able to curtail the 
growth of welfare spending.  States have been able to shape the program’s new rules 
to the policy preferences of their elected officials, and as many states meet the bare 
minimum spending requirements, the federal government has paid an increasingly 
large role in funding welfare.    
 
 III B. Changing “Who Decides?” Changes “Who Pays?” 
 The shares of funding for a program that is paid by the federal government 
and by the states is important for those concerned with redistribution.  One fact of 
federalism that is seldom discussed but which deserves serious contemplation is that 
shifting the responsibility for funding programs to the states also shifts the burden of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Mark Greenberg, “The TANF Maintenance of Effort Requirement,” Center for Law and Social 
Policy, accessed at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/14041.pdf in November, 
2011. 
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paying for them to less affluent Americans.  This is a result of the way that tax 
structures differ across different levels of government.  The federal government 
relies primarily on a progressive income tax and other payroll taxes to fund its 
programs.20  Because money is raised this way, higher income Americans generally 
pay a larger share of their incomes in federal taxes than middle and low income 
Americans do.  States vary dramatically in the sources of their funding.  Legislators, 
governors, and direct democracy voters have set up fiscal systems that rely in 
different measures on income taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes.  There is no 
single state tax structure.  What is generally true, though, is that state taxes all across 
the country are less progressive than federal taxes. 
 A “progressive” tax system is one in which higher income households pay a 
higher tax rate.  By contrast, the less affluent must pay a larger portion of their 
incomes in taxes than the rich in a “regressive” system.  Analyses of the tax rates 
paid by Americans in different income groups show that federal taxes are strongly 
progressive, while nearly every state has, instead, a regressive tax system.  Figure 3, 
below, reports the tax rates paid by different income groups, beginning with the 
poorest 20% of Americans at the top and continuing through to the richest 1% at 
the bottom.  Moving down the chart, we see that Americans who make more money 
pay higher tax rates.  The least affluent income groups pay 3.9% and 9.1% of their 
incomes in federal taxes, because the tax rates on their incomes are so low and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In 2010, 90% of the federal government’s $2.163 trillion budget came from these sources: $899 
billion from personal income taxes, $191 billion from corporate income taxes, and $857 billion from 
Medicare, Social Security, and unemployment insurance taxes (which are not structured in the 
progressive way that income taxes are structured but which are still less regressive than state sales 
taxes).  See Table S3 from the Summary Tables of the Budget of the United States Government, 
Fiscal Year 2012, accessed at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/tables.pdf in October, 
2011.  
	   27	  
Figure 3. Fraction of Income Paid in Federal Taxes, by income group 
Source:  Citizens for Tax Justice, America’s Tax System is Not as Progressive as You Think, 
April 2011.  Based on the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy Tax Model.   
 
because many qualify for the earned income tax credit (EITC), a rebate given to 
those with low incomes to make up for the fact that Social Security taxes are 
withheld from their monthly paychecks.  As incomes rise, eligibility for the EITC 
goes away and   those in the third group, the middle class, pay 13.9% of their income 
in taxes.  The upper middle class pays 17.3% and the richest Americans pay tax rates 
of about 20%, with the rate edging up at every income level.  Overall, taxes paid to 
the federal government take much more from the rich than from the poor.    
 The pattern in the states is radically different.  As Figure 4 shows, state and 
local21 tax rates are highest on the least affluent.  States rely on three general types of 
taxes.  First, many raise money from personal and corporate income taxes, but state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Fiscal analyses that compare states frequently combine state and local receipts because, while some 
states collect more money at the local level than others and some states administer more programs 
than others at the local level, the combined receipts and programs of these two closely interconnected 
levels of government represent the full package of taxes and policies that make states comparable to 
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income tax rates are generally less progressive than federal rates and some states, 
such as Texas and Florida, have no personal income tax at all.  Second, most states22 
fill their coffers with sales taxes, which charge a flat rate on the purchase of products.  
Since poorer Americans spend more of their incomes on these purchases than rich 
Americans, who are generally able to save more money, sales taxes hit the poor 
especially hard.  Finally, states charge property taxes, paid by homeowners and 
passed along, by market forces, to renters.  These rates – which range from 0.40 in 
Hawaii to 2.57 in Texas23 – are flat across property values, and thus generally hit 
lower income earners harder than the affluent.  Although states vary widely in which 
of these three areas they rely most upon for their tax revenues, the cumulative effect 
is that states charge higher rates to poorer residents, acting like the folklore character 
Robin Hood in reverse.         
   Figure 4 reports tax rates by income group for Texas (a relatively low-tax, 
strongly regressive state), California (a high tax, less regressive state) and for the 
average across all states.  In each case, state residents in the lowest income group pay 
the highest rate: 10.2% in California, 12.2% in Texas, and 10.9% across all states.  By 
contrast, the top 1% of earners only pay 7.4% of their income in state taxes in 
California, a mere 3.0% in Texas, and 5.2% nationally.  Averaging across all states, 
tax rates go down as income levels rise, just the opposite of the pattern for federal 
taxes.  Why is this the case?  In Texas, taxes are so clearly regressive because the state 
imposes no personal income tax and instead taxes the sales and housing expenses  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Again, some states – Alaska Delaware, New Hampshire, Montana, and Oregon -- do not charge 
sales taxes at all.  See Federation of Tax Administrators, “State Sales Tax Rates,” February 2011, 
accessed at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.pdf in October 2011. 
23 See New York Times, State-by-State Property-Tax Rates, April 10, 2011, accessed at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/business/11leonhardt-avgproptaxrates.html in October 2011.  
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Figure 4. Fraction of Income Paid in State and Local Taxes, by income group
 
Source:  Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Who Pays?  A Distributional 
Analysis of the Tax Systems of All 50 States, 3rd Edition, November 2009.  Percentages 
reflect net payments by non-elderly families in 2007 after federal deductibility of 
some state taxes in calculating federal income taxes. 
 
that cost the poor so much of their incomes.  California does impose an income tax, 
which explains why it is less regressive than Texas and the state average.  Yet because 
the Golden State’s famous Proposition 13 dramatically reduced property tax receipts, 
it relies on a steep sales tax that taxes the poor heavily.     
Overall, federal taxes take the most from the wealthiest, while state tax 
policies give some of this redistribution back.  The implications for federalism are 
clear.  Any shift in program responsibility from the federal to state governments 
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Devolution, in this respect, works against redistribution.  By contrast, federal 
“bailouts” of the states are paid for much more by high-income earners than tax 
increases enacted at the state level.  Recognizing this does not imply a normative 
judgment about such shifts – there have been strenuous arguments made in favor of 
both progressive and regressive tax structures.  What is hard to debate, however, is 
that changing who decides on a policy by shifting control of it from one level of 
government to another also changes who pays for it.   
  
III. Conclusion: Perspectives on Devolution 
  While modern America may have been created through a war against 
England, its national structure has been formed and reshaped not through fights 
with external powers but by internal conflicts among states and between states and 
the federal government. The battles to define American federalism were once carried 
out in a war and in lunch counter sit-ins, but have now shifted to the courts and to 
federal funding formulas.  These venues may be less dramatic, but they are no less 
important.  As Théret (1992) makes clear, federal systems need not be static, with the 
actual practice of federalism – including whether or not the central government 
equalizes resources across subnational units – determining whether the form of the 
federation will endure, centralize, or dissolve. Though a bloodless revolution, the 
“devolution revolution” nonetheless changed the structure of the federal-state 
relationship and the scope of the social service safety net.   
 Were these changes for the better?  The fiscal federalism literature has long 
argued for an increased role for states in fitting policies to local needs and demands.  
“In our ‘ideal’ model,” declared influential economist Wallace Oates, “the central 
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government provides the efficient out-put of the national public good, while 
numerous local governments offer individuals a wide variety of output of the local 
public good. (Oates 1968, 54)”  The devolution revolution clearly gave states more 
authority over their welfare programs, and provided the opportunity to create new 
health care programs and much of the money to fund them.   
Did this give Americans the structure of government that they wanted?  A 
recent survey asking respondents about what level of government should address 
specific policy challenges found that voters wanted to see the federal government 
address health care, but that state and local governments should assist the poor 
(Schneider et al 2010, 9).  Because the devolutions of the 1990s provided the most 
latitude to states in the welfare realm, both in the freedom to craft policy and 
through the funding mechanism of block grants, this move appears consistent with 
public opinion.    
 Does devolution give residents of each state the programs and policies that 
they desire?  While much research has shown the impact that the preferences of state 
elected officials has on policy choices, a new study based on a breakthrough in the 
ability to measure state public opinion shows that these choices do not always reflect 
voter demands.  Not all states respond equally to public demands, and some do such 
a poor job matching policy with public opinion that there is a potential “democratic 
deficit” in the states (Lax and Phillips 2011).  Combined with Wlezien and Soroka’s 
(2010) recent research showing the challenges that Canadian federalism poses for 
public responsiveness, this recent stream of research raises questions about whether 
giving more authority to states truly brings government closer to the people.      
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Looking toward the future of federalism in America, how do the lessons of 
this essay combine to tell us anything about what might happen if more control over 
the safety net is devolved to the states?  Just as Newt Gingrich pushed to create 
Medicaid block grants in 1995, Republican candidate Mitt Romney called for block 
grants during the 2012 presidential campaign.24  If this new round of devolution 
comes to pass, how will states react?  The lessons of the devolution revolution 
suggest that growth in Medicaid spending will slow dramatically if states have to pay 
all of the costs of program expansion and are allowed to keep all of the savings of 
program cuts.  Medicaid expenditures may flatten out in the way that welfare 
spending has evened out since over the past decade.  This pattern will not be 
uniform across states, of course.  Because the two parties take clearly different 
positions on this issue, statehouses controlled by Republicans will be much more 
likely to use their newfound autonomy to cut Medicaid than Democratic-led states.    
The analysis in this essay, put in the context of recent findings from the 
cross-national study of welfare states, also suggests that the distribution of tax 
burdens could also shape how state policy might shift.  Kato (2003) shows that, 
during the economic downturns of the 1980s, nations with generous social services 
turned to consumption taxes – a regressive yet stable source of income – in order to 
retain funding for their welfare states.  In the American states, taxes are already much 
more regressive than they are at the federal level.  If the next round of devolution 
forces states to provide more of the funding for social services, health care and 
welfare programs might be preserved only by raising regressive taxes such as the 
sales tax.  If the United States thus follows the European path, social service 	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  Sam Baker, “Romney plan calls for Medicaid block grants, repeal of Obama health law,” The Hill, 
September 6, 2011.	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programs will be funded through taxes that burden poor and middle class taxpayers 
most heavily (as a proportion of their incomes).  The redistributive impact of 
Medicaid and welfare would be counterbalanced by a more regressive funding, all 
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